Whether the provisions of the CMR convention regarding suspension and interruption of the statute of limitations violates the principle of legal certainty?

Abstract

The Contracting Parties to the CMR Convention have agreed on a core objective: to harmonize the conditions of international carriage contracts—namely, the documentation required for such transport and the liability of the carrier. However, the provisions of suspension and interruption of the limitation period established in the CMR Convention are interpreted in accordance with the national law of the country where the case is brought. Although the Convention regulates the suspension of the limitation period, it does not define the content requirements for written claims that would effectively suspend this period, leaving this matter to be resolved under the national law of the court seized. Likewise, the institute of interruption of the limitation period, as per the CMR Convention, defers to the national law of the jurisdiction in which proceedings are initiated. This reliance contradicts the Convention’s preamble and may lead to misleading legitimate expectations for the parties involved regarding the regulation of these two institutes.

This article will examine the suspension of the limitation period (hereinafter: Suspension Rule), its concept, application, and interpretation as the CMR Convention does not define for how long the limitation period can be suspended.  The only instance in which the limitation period may resume is when the carrier unambiguously and formally rejects the claim in writing. Such definition creates a problem whereas the limitation period can be suspended for unlimited time period until the carrier rejects the provided claim as CMR Convention does not provide a peremptory (extinguishing) time limit for the suspension of the limitation period, nor does it specify the timeframe within which the carrier must respond. Such legal uncertainty leaves a gap whereas the claimant may be able to pursue the carrier in court even after 5 or 10 years while the general periods of limitations in CMR Convention are 1 year (general period of limitation) and 3 years (wilful misconduct or considered as equivalent to wilful misconduct).

Particular attention will be paid to the written claims (e.g., complaints or notices of claim) which, based on a literal reading of the CMR Convention, should suspend the limitation period. The analysis will rely on international legal doctrine, as well as court practice from Lithuania and other CMR member states, since the Convention does not legally define the content of such claims, again leaving interpretation to the national law of the state in which the proceedings take place. This divergence of interpretation leads to legal uncertainty, which undermines stable legal relations and the legitimate expectations of the contracting parties.

The interruption of the limitation period (hereinafter: Interruption Rule) will also be addressed. According to the literal text of the CMR Convention, this issue is left to the national courts of the contracting states, raising the question of whether the Convention truly intended to harmonize these contractual transport relationships as stated in its preamble.

After analysing the provisions of the CMR Convention, as well as jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Lithuania, lower Lithuanian courts, and courts of other CMR member states, the article concludes that the institutes of suspension and interruption of the limitation period undermine the principle of legal certainty and fail to safeguard the legitimate expectations of the contracting parties.

As noted, a key objective in the Convention’s preamble is the harmonization of carrier liability, including provisions on claims and legal actions. Yet, international practice reveals that these institutes are far from harmonized and are instead applied, interpreted, and understood differently across jurisdictions, violating one of the core principles of civil law—legal certainty. This issue arises because, in all matters of legal ambiguity stemming from the Convention, jurisdiction is granted to the courts of three potential states. Additionally, another major unresolved issue is: What kind of written claim actually suspends the limitation period? Contracting states diverge in their interpretations, and written claims such as “complaint” or “notice of claim” are understood differently depending on the national law and jurisprudence. This problem stems from both translation discrepancies among the Convention’s texts and the failure of the working group to clearly define the content of such claims, leaving interpretation to the contracting parties. Furthermore, although the Convention was drafted in two authentic languages—French and English—even these legal systems regulate the content and criteria of written claims and interruption differently. This article will address these issues using international case law, legal doctrine, and national Lithuanian court practice.

Having examined the meaning of these institutes within the CMR Convention, as well as the related case law at both international and national levels, the conclusion is that the suspension and interruption institutes under the CMR Convention violate the principle of legal certainty and fail to meet the preambular goal of harmonizing international carriage contract terms, particularly in regard to the documentation and carrier liability and does not ensure the legitimate expectations of the parties to the contract.