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The USSR's Stance on the Introduction of Martial Law in Poland in the Light of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's Visit to Moscow on March 1–2, 1982

Dr. Marek Jabłonowski

University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland
Email: marek.jablonowski@uwm.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-6333-7386

Dr. Wojciech Jakubowski

University of Warsaw, Poland
Email: wj.jakubowski@uw.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-1552-8858

Abstract. This article discusses a particular moment in the history of Polish-Soviet relations when the authorities of the Polish People's Republic decided to impose martial law in the early 1980s after the turbulent months of the first Solidarity. The intervention of the power ministries in the internal life of the country and the consequent marginalisation of the Polish United Workers' Party – under the auspices of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski – was criticised in Moscow. This study presents selected declassified documents from the Office of the Council of Ministers of the PPR, which reveal doubts and fears of the Polish side prior to the planned visit of the official party and government delegation to the USSR in March 1982. The material also offers insights into some of the remarks that the Soviet side communicated to its Polish partners during the visit.

Keywords: *Poland, USSR, martial law, Polish-Soviet relations, Wojciech Jaruzelski.*

Anotacija. Šiame straipsnyje aptariamas ypatingas Lenkijos ir Sovietų Sąjungos santykių istorijos momentas, kai Lenkijos Liaudies Respublikos valdžia devintojo dešimtmečio pradžioje po audringų pirmojo „Solidarumo“ mėnesių nusprendė įvesti karo padėtį. Energijos ministerijų kišimasis į šalies vidaus gyvenimą ir dėl to kilusi Lenkijos jungtinės darbininkų partijos, kuriai vadovavo generolas Wojciechas Jaruzelskis, marginalizacija buvo kritikuojama Maskvoje. Šioje studijoje pristatomi atrinkti išslaptinti PPR Ministrų Tarybos biuro dokumentai, atskleidžiantys Lenkijos pusės abejones ir baimes prieš planuojamą oficialios partijos ir vyriausybės delegacijos vizitą į SSRS 1982 m. kovo mėn., įžvalgos apie kai kurias pastabas, kurias sovietų pusė per vizitą perdavė partneriams lenkams.

Esminiai žodžiai: *Lenkija, SSRS, komendanto valanda, Lenkijos–Sovietų Sąjungos santykiai, Wojciechas Jaruzelskis.*

Introduction

The early 1980s marked a significant period in the hitherto history of Poland. Following the chaotic months of the initial Solidarity movement, General Wojciech Jaruzelski¹ and the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic formally decided to impose martial law. According to Norman Davies, the power ministries' intervention in the country's internal affairs was the most impeccable military coup in the history of modern Europe.²

Four decades have passed since, and although most of the direct participants in those events have disappeared from public life in Poland, the debate about the opportunities, culpability, and mistakes of that period has continued and even intensified, often becoming a heated argument. It is not surprising that due to their emotional impact on generations of Poles, the historical processes taking place between 1980 and 1983 have long attracted the attention of researchers. Consequently, they are well-documented, while publications on the subject would probably be difficult to count. Two sub-periods can be distinguished in the time frame in question – the time of a peculiar diarchy³

¹ Jaruzelski Wojciech (1913–2014), General of the Army, Polish Armed Forces, politician, in the years 1964–1989 Member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), in 1970–1971 Deputy Member of the Political Bureau (PB), CC PUWP, in 1971–1989 Member of the PB CC PUWP, in the years 1981–1989 First Secretary of the CC PUWP, in 1968–1983 Minister of National Defence, in 1981–1983 President of the Military Council of National Salvation (MSNC), in the years 1985–1989 President of the Council of State, in 1989–1990 President of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) /Republic of Poland.

² DAVIS, Norman. *Europa. Rozprawa historyka z historią*, Krakow: Publishing house ZNAK, 1999. p. 1181.

³ In Polish literature see selection of documents: *Dokumenty Krajowej Komisji Porozumiewawczej NSZZ „Solidarność” 19 XI 1980 – 1 II 1981*. Warsaw: Publishing house Wydawnictwo IPN, 1981; *Dokumenty uczestników Ruchu Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela 1977–1981*. Prefaced and edited by G. Waligóra.

followed by martial law.⁴ The primary and secondary actors on either side of the great

T. Gąssowski Krakow: Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005; K. Czabański, *Bydgoszcz – marzec 1981. Dokumenty, komentarze, relacje*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza MOST, 1987; *Przed i po 13 grudnia. Państwa bloku wschodniego wobec kryzysu w PRL 1980–1982*, vol. 1; *Sierpień 1980 – marzec 1981*. Selected, prefaced, and edited by Ł. Kamiński. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2006, and vol. 2, *Kwiecień 1981 – grudzień 1982*. Selected, prefaced, and edited by Ł. Kamiński, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2007; *Solidarność Małopolska 1980–1981*. Selected, prefaced, and edited by M. Orski, A. Pliński, E. Zając. Krakow: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2006; *Stan wojenny w dokumentach władz PRL (1980–1981)*. Selected, prefaced, and edited by B. Kopka, G. Majchrzak. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2001; *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego PZPR a „Solidarność” 1980–1981*. Edited by Z. Włodek, vol. 2. London: Wydawnictwo ANEKS 1992; *Narady i telekonferencje kierownictwa PZPR w latach 1980–1981*, Edited by M. Jabłonowski, W. Janowski, W. Władyka, Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA JR, 2004; *Komisja Tadeusza Grabskiego (1981)*, Edited by M. Jabłonowski, W. Janowski, Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA JR, 2013; studies: BACKER, Roman. *Struktury poziome w Toruniu (1980–1981)*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1990; S. Dąbrowski, „Solidarność” Rolników Indywidualnych 1976–1981. *Geneza, nurty, zarys działalności*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo „Silesia”, 1993; J. Holzer, *Solidarność 1980–1981*. Paris: Wydawnictwo Instytut Literacki, 1984; S. Jakubowicz, *Bitwa o samorząd 1980–1981*. London: Wydawnictwo ANEKS, 1988; K. B. Janowski, *Polska 1980–1981. Od euforii do szoku*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1995; L. Mażewski, *W objęciach utopii. Polityczno-ideowa analiza dziejów solidarności 1980–2000*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2001; A. Paczkowski, Andrzej. *Droga do „mniejszego zła”*. *Strategia i taktyka obozu władzy. Lipiec 1980 – styczeń 1982*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002; *Wejść nie wejść. Polska 1980–1982: wewnętrzny kryzys, międzynarodowe uwarunkowania. Konferencja w Jachrance, listopad 1987*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ANEKS, 1999; A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu. Stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1965–1989*. Pułtusk–Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASPRA JR, 2008; and A. Łuczak, *Dekada polskich przemian. Studium władzy i opozycji*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASPRA JR, 2010.

⁴ See selection of documents: *Prawa człowieka i obywatela w PRL 13 XII 1981 – 31 XII 1982*. Paris: Wydawnictwo Instytut Literacki, 1983; *Tajne dokumenty państwo-Kościół 1980–1989*. Edited by P. Raina. London–Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ANEKS, 1993; *Stan wojenny w Polsce. Dokumenty i materiały archiwalne 1981–1983*. Edited by T. Walichnowski, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Comandor, 2001, *Stan wojenny w dokumentach władz PRL (1980–1983)*. Selected and edited by B. Kopka, G. Majchrzak. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2001; studies: Zabocki, W. *Stan wojenny w Małopolsce*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo ARCANA, 1994, J. Holzer, K. Leski, *Solidarność w podziemiu*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 1995; *Polska pod rządami PZPR*. Edited by M. Rakowski. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Oficyna Wydawnicza Profi Sp z o.o., 2000; *Stan wojenny w Polsce 1981–1983*. Edited by A. Dudek. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2003; J. Gmitruk, *Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe 1949–1989*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2004; D. Grala, *Reformy gospodarcze w PRL (1982–1989). Próba uratowania socjalizmu*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo: TRIO, 2005; D. Iwaneczko, *Opór społeczny a władza w Polsce południowo-wschodniej 1980–1989*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2005; *Solidarność podziemna 1981–1989*. Edited by A. Friszke, H. Głębocki, J. Skórzyński et al. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ISP PAN, 2006; A. Paczkowski, *Wojna polsko-jaruzelska. Stan wojenny w Polsce 13 XII 1981–22 VII 1983*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Wielka Litera, 2006; *Stan wojenny w Warszawie i województwie stołecznym 1981–1983*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2009; *Myśli na uwieczni. Kontrola operacyjna środowisk akademickich województwa katowickiego przez Służbę Bezpieczeństwa w latach siedemdziesiątych i osiemdziesiątych XX wieku. Studia i szkice*. Edited by A. Dziuba, M. Sikora. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2010; D. Stola, *Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949–1989*. Warsaw: Wydawcy IPN, ISP PAN, 2010; S. Kwiatkowski, *W stanie wyższej konieczności. Wojsko w sytuacjach konfliktu społecznego w Polsce 1981–1983*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2011; *Stan wojenny z perspektywy lokalnej: Łódź i region 1981–1983*. Edited by S. Hydrysiak. Piotrków Trybunalski: Wydawnictwo Archiwum Państwowe, 2013; M. Romański, *Stan wojenny w województwie rzeszowskim 1981–1983*. Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne i Drukarnia, 2012; *Stan wojenny w regionie świętokrzyskim: 1981–1983*. Edited by P. Gotowiecki. Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski: Wydawnictwo

dispute repeatedly asserted their reasons and arguments.⁵ Authors of popular synthetic studies have not avoided this issue either.⁶ Nonetheless, it is believed there is still much vital research material waiting to be discovered or disseminated. This also applies to the Moscow visit of the Polish party-state delegation headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski in early 1982.⁷

The basis for the analysis in the submitted material are primarily documents authored by Wiesław Górnicki, who appeared in the structure of the Office of the Council of Ministers at the end of 1981.⁸ One of his first tasks was to prepare a speech for General

Ostrowieckie Stowarzyszenie Historyczne „Solidarność i Pamięć”, 2013. P. Petryka, *Polska Ludowa – prawdy niechciane*. Kraków-Włocławek: Pałac Bursztynowy, 2015; F. Puchała, *Kulisy stanu wojennego 1981–1983*. Warszawa: Bellona, 2016.

- ⁵ See: T. Mazowiecki, *Internowanie*. Warszawa: Biblioteka Wolnego Głosu Ursusa, 1982; K. Barcikowski, *Porozumienia*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1983; tegoż, *U szczytów władzy*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Projekt, 1998; L. Wałęsa, *Droga do wolności*. Warszawa: Editions Spotkania, 1991; *Generał Kiszczyk mówi... prawie wszystko*. Edited by W. Bereś, J. Skoczylas. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991; J. Rolicki, Z. Bujak, *Zbigniew Bujak: Przepraszam za „Solidarność”*. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991; S. Kanuia, *Zatrzymać konfrontację*. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1991; J. Pińkowski, *1980. Horyzont przed burzą*. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1993; W. Górnicki, *Teraz już można Ze wspomnień kulawego Szerpy*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1994; A. Kopec, *Stan wojenny i co dalej?*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Projekt, 1996; W. Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny. Dlaczego?*. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992; tegoż *Różnić się mądrze. Jak doszło do stanu wojennego*. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1999; tegoż *Być może to ostatnie słowo (wyjaśnienia złożone przed sądem)*. Warszawa: Comandor, 2008; *Stan wojenny. Wspomnienia i oceny*. Edited by J. Kulas. Pelplin: Bernardinum, 1999; W. Siła-Nowicki, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*. Wrocław: Zarząd Główny Stowarzyszenia Społeczno-Kombatanckiego Wolność i Niezawisłość, 2002; M. Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne 1981–1983*. Warszawa: Iskry, 2004; J. Jankowska, *Portrety niedokończone: rozmowy z twórcami „Solidarności” 1980–1981*. Warszawa: Więź, 2004; A. Orszulik, *Czas przełomu. Notatki z rozmów z władzami PRL 1981–1989*. Warszawa-Ząbki: Wydawnictwo Obserwator, 2006; S. Maciejewskie, *Wojna polsko-polska. Dziennik 1980–1983*. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2007; W. Baka, *Zmagania o reformę. Z dziennika politycznego 1980–1990*. Warszawa: Iskry, 2007; S. Ciosek, *Wspomnienia (niekoniecznie) dyplomatyczne*. Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka, 2014; *Modzelewski-Werblan. Polska Ludowa. Rozmawia R. Walenciak*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ISKRY, 2017.
- ⁶ See: A. Czubiński, *Dzieje najnowsze Polski*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1994; W. Roszkowski, *Najnowsza historia Polski 1914–1993*. London: Wydawnictwo PLUS, 1994; A. Paczkowski, *Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939–1989*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1995; A. Chwalba, *Czasy Solidarności*. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 1997; A. Friszke, *Losy państwa i narodu 1939–1989*. Warszawa: Iskry, 2003; K. B., Janowski, *Źródła i przebieg zmiany politycznej w Polsce (1980–1989)*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003; A. Czubiński, *Historia polski XX wieku*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2000; A. Garlicki, *Historia 1815–2004 Polska i świat*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2005; A. Dudek, Z. Zblewski, *Utopia nad Wisłą. Historia Peerelu*. Warszawa-Bielsko-Biała: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2008; A. Dziurok, M. Gałęzowski, Ł. Kamiński, F. Musiał, *Od niepodległości do niepodległości. Historia polski 1918–1989*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2010, J. Błażejowska, P. Wieczorkiewicz, *Przez Polskę Ludową na przełaj i na przekór*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, 2011.
- ⁷ Apart from discussing the prospective visit, the study also aims to provide essential information on the literature on the subject.
- ⁸ Wiesław Górnicki (1931–1996), a journalist and publicist, 1981–1990 advisor to General W. Jaruzelski, 1984–1985 director of the Independent Study Group and chairman of the Defense Committee of the Prime Minister, 1985–1989 director of the Independent Study Group of the Chairman of the Council of State and Chairman of the National Defense Committee.

Jaruzelski in the event of martial law being declared. On his own initiative, he also prepared daily reports for the Prime Minister. In February 1982, Górnicki was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister and started to build an autonomous team with its own archive whose tasks included preparation of analyses and Jaruzelski's speeches, and assessments of the situation. In January 1984, by regulation of the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, an Independent Study Group headed by Górnicki was established for the Prime Minister. In the mentioned period, Górnicki was an important member of General Jaruzelski's immediate political support⁹. The relatively low military rank of major did not mean that he was a person of little importance in the hierarchy of political influence. Using a certain metaphor, his importance and influence can be compared with the role of Father [Père] Joseph (advisor to Cardinal Richelieu)¹⁰.

Historical Background

In September 1980, following the deposition of Edward Gierek¹¹, the election of Stanisław Kania¹² as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) meant that the extreme pro-Moscow wing of the PUWP was prevented from seizing control of the Party. Kania received congratulations and assurances of total support from Leonid Brezhnev.¹³

With impatience and concern, the Soviet leadership watched chaos escalate in Poland and called on the Polish authorities to take vigorous action. Contrary to the claims of the authorities of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) the Soviet side was unwilling

⁹ G. Sołtysiak writes more on the subject, *System doradców politycznych generała Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego. Historia Zespołu Doradców i Analiz*, [in:] *Kuchnia władzy. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji 7-tej rocznicy urodzin Andrzeja Garlickiego*, eds. W. Borodziej, J. Kochanowski, Warsaw 2005, pp. 305–326.

¹⁰ François Joseph Le Clerc du Tremblay, known as Father Joseph [Père Joseph], lived from 1577 to 1638. He was called, after the color of his monastic habit, "éminence grise."

¹¹ Gierek Edward (1913–2001), a mining engineer, activist of the French Communist Party, Communist Party of Belgium, Polish Workers' Party (PWP), PUWP, in 1954–1980 Member of the CC PUWP, in 1956 and 1959–1980 Member of the PB CC PUWP, in the years 1949–1954 and 1957–1970 Secretary of the Province Council (PC) PUWP in Katowice, in 1954–1956 head of the Department of Heavy Industry at the CC PUWP, in 1956–1964 Secretary of the CC PUWP, in 1970–1980 First Secretary of the CC PUWP.

¹² Kania Stanisław (born in 1927), economist, PUWP activist, in 1964–1968 Deputy Member of the CC PUWP, in 1968–1986 Member of the CC PUWP, in the years 1971–1975 Deputy Member of the PB CC PUWP, in 1975–1981 Member of the PB CC PUWP, in 1971–1980 Secretary of the CC PUWP, in 1980–1981 First Secretary of the CC PUWP.

¹³ More broadly on the issue in A. Łuczak, *Dekada...* pp. 197–198. The Party and government authorities in Poland decided to adopt the view that that summer the workers protested against the erroneous policies embodied by the party leadership headed by E. Gierek, rather than against the party as such. In line with such a notion, Kania had the benefit of renewed public confidence and, consequently, the opportunity to bring the situation under control.

to control the political situation in the country.¹⁴ Other neighbouring states were also pressing for decisive measures. The GDR leaders began to push for a halt to the passport-free tourist traffic between Poland and its western neighbour. In November, there were signs of Czechoslovak troops regrouping near the Polish border.¹⁵ Given the circumstances, there were repeated suggestions or even pressure in the PUWP circles for a quick solution to the problem, in line with the power-based Soviet scenario. Kania would nod in assent, but he had neither the will nor the courage to take direct steps and tried to resolve the conflict peacefully, which in effect led to a policy of manoeuvring between the various factions that proved to exist, even within the Party. On the other hand, as early as the November meeting of the Committee for National Defence, there was talk of drafting the necessary legislation concerning martial law, and work on the matter continued systematically within the structures of the power ministries.

The countries of the Eastern Bloc adhered to the Brezhnev doctrine, which essentially affirmed that the Soviet Union would defend socialism wherever it was threatened in the opinion of its leaders.¹⁶ In accordance with the doctrine, a conference of representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states was held in Moscow on December 5, 1980, during which the leadership of the PUWP was accused of leniency towards Solidarity, even though Stanisław Kania had presented a plan of action adopted to impose martial law.¹⁷ Meanwhile, members of the Polish General Staff were introduced to a plan for a major Warsaw Pact military exercise on Polish territory, which must have been perceived as a preparation for possible intervention.

The situation grew increasingly complicated. There was a concentration of USSR troops on the eastern border,¹⁸ and it was obvious that an intervention would mean Poland's power transfer into the hands of a new government. Highly concerned, President Jimmy Carter¹⁹ warned that the "unprecedented build-up of Soviet forces along

¹⁴ The following is stated in the material from the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dated October 29, 1980: "Brezhnev and Ustinov spoke in favour of introducing martial law in Poland, Gromyko and Suslov were against it," after A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, pp. 236–238.

¹⁵ A. Łuczak, *Dekada...*, p. 199.

¹⁶ The Brezhnev Doctrine was in force in the Eastern Bloc countries, the meaning of which was that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene militarily (as in 1968 in Czechoslovakia) in a country where—according to the Kremlin—socialism (i.e., Soviet leadership) was threatened. At the 5th Congress of the PUWP in November 1968, Brezhnev conceded that the issue of socialism "is not only a matter for the nation of a given country, but also a common problem, which concerns all socialist states."

¹⁷ *Dokument nr 93. 5 XII 1980. Stenogram ze spotkania przywódców państw członkowskich Układu Warszawskiego* [in:] *Przed i po 13 grudnia...*, vol. 1, *Sierpień 1980–marzec 1981*. Selected and edited by Ł. Kamiński. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2007, pp. 234–280.

¹⁸ *Wejść nie wejść. Polska 1980–1982: wewnętrzny kryzys, międzynarodowe uwarunkowania. Konferencja w Jachrance, listopad 1997*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ANEKS, 1999. pp. 163, 167, 168 and *Ekspertyza M. Zgórniaka* [in:] *O stanie wojennym w Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997, pp. 175–176.

¹⁹ Carter Jimmy (born in 1924), American politician, in 1971–1975 governor of Georgia (D), in 1977–1981 *US President, Peace Nobel Prize Laureate in 2002*.

the Polish border”²⁰ would affect US-Soviet relations. In hindsight, it may be argued that the USSR leadership at the time was far from abandoning the Brezhnev doctrine, although it was reluctant to consider direct deployment of its armed forces. The talks or plans of a prospective military exercise were intended to induce the Polish leadership to move more decisively to restore full power in the country.²¹

In the new situation, Wojciech Jaruzelski took over as Prime Minister at the beginning of February and held the office of Minister of National Defence.²² Jaruzelski enjoyed the confidence of Soviet politicians and appeared to offer a guarantee that the Polish authorities alone were capable of resolving social revolt. Consequently, instead of the party, the army and the government administration under its control undertook active measures against the opposition.

The plans to introduce martial law if necessary were camouflaged with yet another proposal. The appointment of Mieczysław F. Rakowski²³ as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of relations with the trade unions manifested the will to reach an agreement with the opposition. Speaking in the Sejm, the new Prime Minister announced a ten-point government program which envisaged improving living standards and a better supply of products for the population, combating speculation, supporting housing construction, aiding agriculture, and increasing work discipline. Jaruzelski called for “three months of dedicated labour: 90 peaceful days.”²⁴

Aleksander Łuczak²⁵ stresses that the provision of the August Agreement, according to which “the PUWP exercises the steering role in the state,” was indispensable for the

²⁰ A. Mania, *Detente i polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Europy Wschodniej styczeń 1969–styczeń 1981*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2003. p. 176.

²¹ Opinions of politicians, political commentators, and historians in that regard have been gathered by A. Skrzypek (*Mechanizmy klientelizmu...* p. 244). More broadly in *Wypowiedź Z. Brzezińskiego na konferencji w Jachrance* [in:] *Wejść nie wejść...* p. 173; W. Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny...* p. 42; S. Kania, *Zatrzymać konfrontację*. Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1990. p. 91 and R. Terlecki, *Miecz i tarcza komunizmu. Historia aparatu bezpieczeństwa w Polsce 1944–1990*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2007, p. 264.

²² More broadly in M. Jabłonowski, W. Jakubowski, *Ostatnie miesiące ancien regime'u (Polska na przełomie 1988 i 1989 roku)* [in:] *Refleksje o przeszłości, spojrzenie na współczesność. Monografia poświęcona Profesorowi Sergiuszowi Wasiucie z okazji 60-letniego Jubileuszu i 35-lecia pracy zawodowej*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Drukarnia Styl Anna Dura, 2018.

²³ Rakowski Mieczysław Franciszek (1926–2008), a journalist, politician, in 1964–1975 Deputy Member of the CC PUWP, in the years 1975–1990 Member of the CC PUWP, in 1987–1990 Member of the PB CC PUWP, in 1957–1982 deputy editor-in-chief, and later editor-in-chief of the *Polityka* weekly, in 1988 Secretary of the CC PUWP, in 1989–1990 First Secretary of the CC PUWP, in 1981–1985 Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, in the years 1988–1990 President of the Council of Ministers, in 1972–1989 Member of the Sejm of the PPR.

²⁴ M. Jabłonowski, *Komisja Nadzwyczajna do Kontroli Realizacji Porozumień z Gdańska, Szczecina i Jastrzębia w 1981 r.* „Edukacja Polityczna” 1990, no. 15, pp. 169–170.

²⁵ Łuczak Aleksander Piotr (born in 1943), politician and historian, professor of humanities, scholar at the University of Warsaw, in 1966–1989 member of the United People's Party (UPP), in 1989–1990 a member of the Polish People's Party “Odrodzenie”, in 1990–2001 a member of the Polish People's Party, in the years 1988–1990 Deputy Minister of National Education, in 1993–1996 Vice-President

party authorities and difficult for Solidarity to accept. Both parties signed the commitment, but—as it turned out—it meant something different to each. It was a boundary that, out of geopolitical necessity, Solidarity did not want to cross, at least publicly, even though it knew full well that the Party enjoyed no public confidence and had no moral authority. This gave rise to a conviction within Solidarity that if the authorities were to “put the screws on,” they would yield.²⁶

The tension mounted as the Bydgoszcz events of mid-March revealed that Solidarity was taking more decisive action and was close to declaring a general strike.²⁷ After the Bydgoszcz events, Solidarity gained tremendous support across virtually all social strata.²⁸ On the one hand, it was once again possible with the support of the Primate²⁹, to politically resolve the conflict and the Warsaw Agreement was concluded³⁰; on the other, those events coincided with the adoption and signing of the final version of the document entitled *The Guiding Principle for the Introduction of Martial Law on the Territory of the Polish People's Republic*.³¹ The tensions were exacerbated by the joint military exercises of the Warsaw Pact countries codenamed Alliance-81, which were being held—not at all accidentally—in the territory of Poland at the time. According to Ryszard Kukliński³², the manoeuvres did not involve any military objectives but served to identify the possibility of taking action against the opposition.³³

of the Council of Ministers, in 1993–1995 Minister of National Education, in 1995–1997 Chair of the Committee for Scientific Research, in 2003–2005 Vice-Chair of the National Broadcasting Council, in the years 1989–2001 Member of the Sejm of the 10th, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Term.

²⁶ T. Kowalik, *Próba kompromisu. O Komisji Ekspertów MKS w Gdańsku*, „Zeszyty Literackie” 1983, no. 2, p. 115.

²⁷ “Bydgoszcz events”—the brutal intervention of the security authorities during the session of the Voivodeship National Council against the delegation of NSZZ “Solidarity” resulted in readiness to strike throughout the country, and as a result—the signing of the Warsaw Agreement, which provided for, among others, consent to register the Independent and Self-Governing Farmers’ Trade Union “Solidarity” [Rural Solidarity]; M. Jabłonowski, *Komisja...*, p. 173.

²⁸ K. Brunetko, A. Brzeziecki, J. Skoczylas, *Wałęsa – Ludzie – Epoka*. Warsaw: Edipresse, 2005, p. 103.

²⁹ B. Piasecki], *Ostatnie dni Prymasa Tysiąclecia*. Rome: Wydawnictwo Dom Polski Jana, 1982, p. 32.

³⁰ It was finalised largely thanks to the contribution of the experts, including Wiesław Chrzanowski, Bronisław Geremek, Jerzy Bafia and Sylwester Zawadzki. Certain significance should also be attributed to the involvement of the Primate’s representative Romuald Kukułowicz and Professor Jan Szczepański, who had the mandate of a representative of the parliamentary committee on the one hand, and the support of Gen. Jaruzelski on the other; more in M. Jabłonowski, *Komisja...* On the “member government” side, Kania believed that Rakowski had overstepped his mandate in the March talks, whereas the opposition found it difficult to accept the agreement, and Lech Wałęsa came under criticism from many of his close associates.

³¹ A. Dudek, Z. Zblewski, *Utopia...*, p. 308.

³² Kukliński Ryszard (1930–2004), colonel of the Polish Armed Forces, since 1970 an agent of the American intelligence service; he provided the US with plans for the introduction of martial law in Poland; in 1981 transferred by the CIA to West Berlin; sentenced in absentia to death in 1984; rehabilitated and acquitted in 1997; posthumously promoted to General of the Brigade in 2016.

³³ K. Dubiński, I. Jurczenko, *Oko Pentagonu. Rzecz o pułkowniku Ryszardzie Kuklińskim*. Warsaw: Intryga, 1995, pp. 98–101 and W. Jaruzelski, *Historia nie powinna dzielić*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2006, pp. 39–40.

In early April 1981, Kania and Jaruzelski were summoned by Yuri Andropov and Dimitri F. Ustinov to Brest. In the opinion of the Soviet politicians, the Bydgoszcz events were another concession and a sign of weakness on the part of the Polish authorities.³⁴ They urged the Polish leadership to go on the offensive and regain control of the situation. Andropov insisted that a document on “the introduction of martial law, which was prepared with the help of our comrades” be signed forthwith. The Polish leaders appealed to be given time to “restore order through their own efforts” and to have the relevant document go through the Sejm.³⁵ In addition, Mikhail Suslov arrived in Warsaw and, at a meeting with members of the Political Bureau of the CC PUWP, passed a number of critical remarks against the latter body, calling the actions of Solidarity a peaceful counter-revolution, a dismantling of power. He censured the stance of party institutions in the field and stressed the anti-Soviet bias of the mass media.³⁶ In those days, the Soviet side once again decided to support the Kania–Jaruzelski tandem, bringing constant pressure to bear on both rather than seeking other personal solutions.³⁷

Preparations for the introduction of martial law were scheduled over several months. Pressure from Moscow did not cease. Another signal arrived in June. The leadership of the PUWP received a letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU. The missive expressed concern about the situation in Poland, fraught with “impending danger,” and stressed that the present leadership had failed to live up to expectations, making concessions under pressure from counter-revolutionary forces. In conclusion, Brezhnev cited as a reminder: “We shall not abandon socialist Poland, brotherly Poland, in time of need nor shall we allow it to be harmed.”³⁸ The unprecedented criticism of the Polish party leadership may have been intended to reveal who strongly supported a direct solution involving the use of force.³⁹ Soviet authorities no longer suggested conducting Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres; the conception prevailed that the crisis in Poland had to be resolved by Polish forces by imposing martial law.

Consequently, that month, the 11th Plenum of the CC PUWP witnessed a confrontation between the hardliners and the party leadership, which could be described as an

³⁴ *Dokument nr 8, Aneks. 2 IV 1981. Protokół posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC KPZR*, [in:] *Przed i po 13 grudnia...*, vol. 2, pp. 659, 660. See also A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, p. 258.

³⁵ *Posiedzenie BP KC KPZR 9 IV 1981*, [in:] W. Pawłow, *Byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce*, p. 324. See also K. Dubiński, I. Jurczenko, *Oko Pentagonu...*, p. 105.

³⁶ A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, pp. 262–263. M. Suslov arrived in Warsaw on April 23.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 259–260.

³⁸ *Dokument no. 191. 5 VI 1981. List KC KPZR do KC PZPR w sprawie sytuacji w PRL i w PZPR* [in:] *Przed i po 13 grudnia...* pp. 66–68. Recollecting on his contacts with various representatives of the intelligence services, Czesław Kiszczak (“1988 rok. Prawda według generała Kiszczaka,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* 23–24 VIII 2008), noted: “Those talks reinforced my conviction that Solidarity – openly hostile to socialism – was unacceptable to the leadership of the brotherly parties at the time and that, at this historical stage, the movement must be severely curtailed or dismantled. The leaderships of Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR were particularly aggressive.”

³⁹ *Posiedzenie BP KC KPZR. 18 VI 1981 r.*, [in:] W. Pawłow, *Byłem rezydentem KGB...*, p. 343.

attempted “party coup.” It was suggested that those who do not know how to govern must resign. After a heated debate, a motion for a vote of confidence in the Politburo was dismissed.⁴⁰ The subsequent 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Party also proved a testing time. Held in July 1981, it generally confirmed the political impasse in which the ruling party found itself and its inability to carry out fundamental reforms.

Martial Law

Faced with the deepening rifts in the PUWP leadership, Stanisław Kania stepped down as First Secretary CC PUWP in October 1981, and the office was assumed by Wojciech Jaruzelski, who thus accumulated enormous power in his hands. At that point, he seemed determined to impose martial law. Only a political decision was needed to set the process in motion. As another wave of strikes swept through the country in October and November, the events in Poland aroused enormous global interest on the one hand, and far-reaching and growing concern among the neighbouring countries on the other. In view of the stalemate in political negotiations with the NSZZ Solidarity, failure of the “last-ditch” talks involving W. Jaruzelski, Cardinal J. Glemp,⁴¹ and L. Wałęsa⁴² as well as mounting pressure from the allied states, the USSR in particular, the Council of State formally imposed martial law throughout the country at a meeting in Belweder⁴³ on December 12 around midnight, invoking the danger of a national catastrophe to justify their decision.⁴⁴ In January 1982, the Sejm of the Polish People’s Republic legitimised the decision by passing a pertinent act.⁴⁵ Thus, a coup d’état took

⁴⁰ A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, p. 268.

⁴¹ Glemp Józef (1924–1913) Cardinal, in 1981–2009 Primate of Poland, in 1981–1992 Archbishop, Metropolitan of Gniezno, in 1981–2006 Archbishop, Metropolitan of Warsaw.

⁴² Wałęsa Lech (born in 1943), electrician, trade union activist, in the years 1980–1982 Chair of the National Coordinating Commission of NSZZ Solidarity, in 1981–1982 interned, in 1987–1990 Chair of the National Executive Commission NSZZ Solidarity, in 1989 participant of the Round Table Talks, in 1990–1995 President of the Republic of Poland, Peace Nobel Prize Laureate in 1983.

⁴³ Belweder – a palace in Warsaw; until 1935, the residence of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. During the Polish People’s Republic, the official residence of the President of the Council of State.

⁴⁴ The reasons behind the decision included the catastrophic state of the country’s economy, the PUWP’s concerns about power slipping out of its hands with the rise of NSZZ Solidarity, infighting between PUWP factions regarding the direction and scope of reforms, as well as the threat of armed intervention from Poland’s neighbouring socialist states. R. Kraczkowski (*Sejm w okresie PRL* [in:] *Dzieje Sejmu polskiego*, ed. J. Bardach. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997. p. 299) underlines that the Council of State violated constitutional provisions when issuing the decrees.

⁴⁵ Journal of Laws of 1982, no. 3 item 18; see *Ustawa o szczególnej regulacji prawnej w okresie stanu wojennego*. Komentarze m.in.: R. Kraczkowski, *Sejm w okresie...* p. 299 and J. Stembrowicz, *Rada Państwa w początkach lat osiemdziesiątych*, „Studia Prawnicze”, 1989, no. 2–3, p. 250.

place in Poland⁴⁶, as a result of which the public movement seeking to change the political system was effectively suppressed.

The Military Council of National Salvation (MCNS) was established, with General Jaruzelski as its chairman. His speech announcing the introduction of martial law was broadcast at 6.00 a.m. on December 13 through the electronic media.⁴⁷ The power ministries assumed the governance of the country. The decisions taken were to be implemented primarily by the structures of the Ministry of National Defence (where Minister Florian Siwicki⁴⁸ coordinated the operations of around 70,000 Polish Armed Forces soldiers) and the Ministry of the Interior (with Minister Czesław Kiszczak⁴⁹ coordinating the actions of 30,000 law enforcement officers). At the same time, 1,750 tanks and 1,400 armoured vehicles were deployed in the cities.⁵⁰ Many institutions were militarised, including the national television broadcaster, whereas the courts were to operate on a summary basis. Under the martial law decree, more than 5,000 people (including 300 women) were interned⁵¹ at 49 facilities prepared throughout the country; individual organisations, including the NSZZ Solidarity, were declared illegal; printed and electronic media were significantly restricted (apart from the central newspapers, i.e., *Trybuna Ludu* and *Żołnierz Wolności*, as well as 17 organs of the PUWP province committees, no other periodicals were published), correspondence was censored; changing one's place of residence was prohibited unless administrative authorities were notified and a strict curfew was imposed.

The perplexed PUWP structures found themselves on the defensive. Many activists at various levels of the party hierarchy lost their positions, and several dozen organisations were disbanded. The martial law authorities also decided to intern 32 members of the 1970s party leadership in Promnik; the MCNS thus symbolically demonstrated

⁴⁶ Cf. opinions advanced by W. Roszkowski (*Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1914–1993*, vol. 2. Warsaw: Świat Książki, 1995. p. 826), A. Ajnenkiel (*Konstytucje Polski w rozwoju dziejowym 1791–1997*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, 2001. p. 335) or A. Friszke (*Polska. Losy państwa i narodu 1939–1989*. Warsaw: Iskry, 2003, p. 404).

⁴⁷ W. Jaruzelski stated, for instance: *Fellow countrymen! On the night of 12–13 December 1981, the Military Council of National Salvation was established (...) Aided by the armed forces of the People's Republic of Poland and counting on the trust and support of all patriotic and progressive social forces, the Military Council of National Salvation is determined to ensure internal peace and security of the country* [translation].

⁴⁸ Siwicki Florian (1925–2013), General of the Army of the Polish Armed Forces, in 1975–1990 Member of the CC PUWP, in 1986–1990 a Member of the PB CC PUWP, 1983–1990 Minister of National Defence, in 1976–1989 Member of the Sejm of the PPR.

⁴⁹ Kiszczak Czesław (1925–2015) General of the Branch of the Polish Armed Forces, in 1980–1981 Deputy Member of the CC PUWP, in 1981–1990 a Member of the CC PUWP, in the years 1982–1986 Deputy Member of the PB CC PUWP, in 1986–1990 Member of the PB CC PUWP, 1981–1990 Minister of the Interior, 1989 President of the Council of Ministers, in 1985–1989 Member of the Sejm of the PPR.

⁵⁰ A. Paczkowski, *Pół wieku dziejów Polski*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2005, pp. 331–355.

⁵¹ Initially, L. Wałęsa was detained in isolation in Skolimowo, then at the government centers in Chylce and Otwock Wielki, and subsequently in Arłamów.

that it held them responsible for the condition of the state and its economy.⁵² Interestingly, such a move by the MCNS violated the hitherto prevailing principle of the party's supremacy over the military and the security agencies.⁵³ It was symbolic that W. Jaruzelski exercised power from the Prime Minister's office in Aleje Ujazdowskie rather than from the First Secretary of the CC PUWP in Nowy Świat.⁵⁴ Consequently, this also had implications for the relations with the CPSU.

The first days of martial law saw an event that gained particular notoriety, as the strike at the "Wujek" Coal Mine in Katowice was violently suppressed. The workers clashed with the military and the police. Casualties among the strikers included 9 miners killed and 21 wounded; among those pacifying the strike, 41 police officers and soldiers were reported wounded, 11 of them seriously. Solidarity's structures went underground. Numerous trade union activists, including Władysław Frasyniuk⁵⁵ and Zbigniew Bujak⁵⁶, successfully evaded arrest for many months. The timeline below⁵⁷ outlines the most important events of the martial law period, which preceded Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow:

December 13, 1981: the Council of State introduces martial law; the MCNS is established; most members of the National Commission of the NSZZ Solidarity are interned; a network of internment facilities is established; school and university education is suspended; telephone communications are interrupted; a curfew is imposed; in his sermons at Jasna Góra and later in Warsaw, Primate of Poland Józef Glemp appeals to all to remain realistic and abandon any thought of fratricidal struggle;

- December 14, 1981: the army surrounds the Gdańsk Shipyard; in response to the martial law, NSZZ Solidarity begins to organise strikes;

⁵² Among those interned were E. Gierek, P. Jaroszewicz, J. Szydłak, T. Wrzaszczyk or E. Babiuch, see AAN, KC PZPR, ref. no. XI c/67, f. 1–12: cf. commentaries in A. Łuczak, *Dekada...*, pp. 330–331 and *Komisja Tadeusza Grabskiego...*, pp. 28–29.

⁵³ S. Trepczyński, J. Eisler, *Grudzień '70*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Colibri, 1991, p. 74

⁵⁴ A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...* p. 289.

⁵⁵ Frasyniuk Władysław (born in 1954), driver, opposition activist, trade union activist, politician, since 1980 member of NSZZ Solidarity, head of Regional Board for Lower Silesia, member of the National Commission (NC) in 1981, NSZZ Solidarity, initially underground during martial law, then arrested and convicted in 1982 and in the years 1986–1987 a member of the Temporary Coordinating Commission NSZZ Solidarity, in 1989 a participant of the Round Table Talks, in 1991–2001 Member of the Sejm of the RP, in 2001–2005 Chair of the Freedom Union, and in the years 2005–2006 Chair of the Democratic Party.

⁵⁶ Bujak Zbigniew (born in 1954), trade union activist, politician, head of the Regional Board of NSZZ Solidarity for Mazovia in 1981, member of the NC NSZZ Solidarity, remained underground during martial law, arrested in 1986 and released the same year under amnesty, in 1989 a participant of the Round Table Talks, and in the years 1991–1997 Member of the Sejm of the RP.

⁵⁷ Compiled based on: A. Andrusiewicz, *Polska 1980–1990. Kalendarz dekady przełomu*. Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1995; *Stan wojenny w Polsce: kalendarz wydarzeń 13 XII 1981–31 XII 1982*. Edited by W. Chudzik. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo RYTM, 1999; [https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stan_wojenny_w_Polsce_\(1981-1983\)](https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stan_wojenny_w_Polsce_(1981-1983)).

- December 15, 1981: pacification of the “Manifest Lipcowy” Coal Mine; at the neighbouring “1 Maja” Coal Mine, ZOMO (Motorized Reserves of the Citizens’ Militia) compel the workers to end the strike through a demonstration of force;
- December 16, 1981: pacification of the “Wujek” Coal Mine by the army and ZOMO;
- pacification of the Gdańsk Repair Shipyard, a mass demonstration and subsequent street fighting in Gdańsk lasts many hours;
- December 17, 1981: ZOMO crushes demonstrations in Gdańsk and Krakow; one killed and two injured among the demonstrators in Gdańsk;
- December 20, 1981: end of the strike at the Port of Gdańsk; end of the underground strike at the “Anna” Coal Mine in Wodzisław Śląski;
- December 21, 1981: PPR ambassador to the United States Romuald Spasowski⁵⁸ requests political asylum;
- December 23, 1981: pacification at the “Huta Katowice” steelworks, the United States imposes economic sanctions against the PPR.
- December 28, 1981: end of the last occupation strike at the “Piaś” Coal Mine; *Interrogation*, a film by Ryszard Bugajski⁵⁹ is withdrawn from distribution (for nine years); PPR ambassador to Japan, Zdzisław Rurarz⁶⁰ requests political asylum;
- January 4, 1982: classes in schools are resumed;
- January 6, 1982: the authorities dissolve the Independent Students’ Association;
- January 10, 1982: telephone communication is restored in the cities;
- January 13, 1982: the National Resistance Committee is established as the first nationwide structure of the trade union, led by Eugeniusz Szumiejka⁶¹;
- January 25, 1982: during a sitting, the Sejm of the People’s Republic of Poland of the 8th Term passes—with one dissenting vote—the act on special regulation

⁵⁸ Spasowski Romuald (1921–1995), diplomat, 1972–1978 Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977–1981 Ambassador of the PPR to the US, where he requested political asylum following the introduction of martial law, in 1982 convicted in absentia to death, in 1985 deprived of Polish citizenship by the Council of State, acquitted in 1990.

⁵⁹ Bugajski Ryszard (born in 1943), Polish film and television director as well as author and screenwriter, director and author of the screenplay of *Interrogation*, a historical drama from 1982, the most famous Polish “shelved picture”, described by the authorities as “the most anti-communist film in the history of the People’s Republic of Poland”; its production became the reason for the dissolution of Zespół Filmowy “X”, a film-making studio headed by A. Wajda. The film, banned by the censors, circulated on VHS tapes in the underground, premiering in 1989.

⁶⁰ Rurarz Zbigniew (1930–2007), diplomat, 1981 Ambassador of the PPR to Japan, following introduction of martial law, requested political asylum at the US embassy in Tokyo.

⁶¹ Szumiejko Eugeniusz (born in 1946), astronomer, IT engineer, scholar at the University of Wrocław, since 1980 in NSZZ Solidarity, since 1981 a member of the NC NSZZ Solidarity, in the years 1982–1984 and 1987 in the Temporary Coordinating Commission, NSZZ Solidarity, in 1986–1988 head of the Regional Strike Committee for Lower Silesia, in 1990–1992 a member of the NC NSZZ Solidarity.

for the period of martial law, sanctioning the decree under which it had been introduced;

- January 30, 1982: the “Day of Solidarity with Poland” is celebrated in many international cities;
- February 1, 1982: price hikes;
- February 3, 1982 – the Naval Court in Gdynia passes sentences for participation in strikes during martial law; Ewa Kubasiewicz⁶² from the Higher Maritime School is sentenced to 10 years in prison;
- February 5, 1982: numerous cities (Świdnik being the first) witness “strolling” demonstrations (whereby people would *en masse* take walks during the official evening news at 7:30 p.m.);
- February 8, 1982: classes and lectures are resumed at universities;
- February 11, 1982 – in response to the walking demonstrations in Świdnik a curfew is introduced from 7:30 p.m.; the second (first) issue of *Tygodnik Mazowsze* is published in Warsaw;
- February 13, 1982: 45 inmates are beaten at the internment facility in Wierzychowo Pomorskie;
- February 23, 1982: death of Zdzisław Karos⁶³;
- February 27, 1982 – *Man of Iron*, directed by Andrzej Wajda⁶⁴, is withdrawn from the Academy Award competition.

In addition to repressions, which commonly involved protesters being indicted in various forms by the prosecution and then convicted – usually to prison sentences – the authorities decided to have the NSZZ Solidarity activists dismissed from work, many were coerced into emigration, and vetting of staff was widely adopted, including courts, administration, and the media. After the initial shock, citizens responded with a boycott of state-controlled organisations and institutions. An underground press and publishing movement were soon created, and gradually, an independent information system emerged. The Catholic Church launched a wide-ranging campaign to aid the persecuted, while the NSZZ Solidarity was supported morally and materially by French and American trade union organisations and centers.

⁶² Kubasiewicz-Houee Ewa (born in 1940), Polish studies graduate, librarian, trade union activist, in 1980 a member of NSZZ Solidarity, arrested and convicted on December 20, 1981, released from prison in 1983 under amnesty, emigrated permanently in 1988.

⁶³ Karos Zdzisław (1947–1982), sergeant of the Citizens’ Militia, killed as a member of the organisation known as Armed Forces of Underground Poland attempted to seize his sidearm.

⁶⁴ Wajda Andrzej (1926–2016), film and theatre director, production designer, debuted with *A Generation* (1955), one of the leading artists of the Polish school of film (*Sewer* 1957, *Ashes and Diamonds* 1958), head of Zespół Filmowy “X”; his work combined auteur cinema of outstanding sensibility with social engagement; Academy Award nominee, Academy Award winner for lifetime achievement (2000), in 1989–1991 Senator of the Sejm of the 1st Term, Knight of the Order of the White Eagle.

Preparations and the Visit

A historian investigating Polish-Soviet relations of those years states that martial law in Poland was greeted with applause in Moscow and that the Soviet authorities were reportedly informed of the Polish intentions one day in advance.⁶⁵ Having successfully imposed martial law and suppressed public resistance, the PPR authorities turned to the USSR for political and economic support. In a letter to Brezhnev, General W. Jaruzelski asked for additional supplies (of raw materials, oil, and grain) and foreign currency, to which the Soviet side responded with some restraint. In this situation, the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy, Zbigniew Madej⁶⁶, travelled to Moscow in January 1982, followed by the Secretary of the CC PUWP Józef Czyrek⁶⁷, who assured Mikhail Suslov that the PUWP would not be dissolved in Poland and that the aim was to restore the status quo prior to 1980. At a meeting of the CPSU Political Bureau, Brezhnev commented on his talks, noting that the Polish leadership, despite the successful introduction of martial law, did not know how to answer the question of “what’s next?”⁶⁸ Another mission from Warsaw arrived in Moscow in February with Deputy Prime Minister Roman Malinowski⁶⁹ to discuss economic issues with one of his Soviet counterparts. Unexpectedly, he was received by a delegation of the Soviet Politburo headed by L. Brezhnev.⁷⁰

In such circumstances, the prospective visit to Moscow of the Polish party-state delegation headed by General W. Jaruzelski became particularly significant. Published files demonstrate that the delegation assured the Soviet authorities that Poland was, and would remain, a socialist state and that the alliance with the USSR was the cornerstone of its policies. Likewise, it was affirmed that Poland was, and would remain, a permanent link of the socialist community within the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and that no actions would be undertaken to affect any regime

⁶⁵ A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, p. 290

⁶⁶ Madej Zbigniew (born in 1932), professor of economic sciences, in 1975–1980 Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Finance, in 1980–1981 Deputy Chair of the Planning Commission to the Council of Ministers, in 1981–1982 Chair of the of the Planning Commission to the Council of Ministers, and in 1981–1983 Vice-President of the Council of Ministers.

⁶⁷ Czyrek Józef (1928-2013), economist, politician, diplomat, member of the PUWP, in 1980–1982 Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1981–1989 Secretary of the CC PUWP and Member of the PB CC PUWP, and in 1989–1990 Minister of State at the Chancellery of the President of the PPR/RP.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*. pp. 291–292; A. Skrzypek, *Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989*. Pułtusk–Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA, 2010. pp. 336–337. Specifically, the Soviet leader wished to know what was going to happen with the suspended trade unions and whether there were any plans for economic recovery.

⁶⁹ Malinowski Roman (born in 1935), economist, politician, UPP activist, in 1976–1989 Member of the Presidium of the UPP, in 1981–1989 President of the Supreme Committee UPP, in 1980–1985 Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, in 1980 Minister for Food Industry and Purchasing, in the years 1976–1989 Member of the Sejm of the PPR, and in 1985–1989 Marshal of the Sejm of the PPR.

⁷⁰ A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, pp. 292–293.

change. Principles of bilateral cooperation were agreed upon, as well as a policy line towards the Western countries, as part of which a new disarmament offensive was to take place, conducted through the CSCE.⁷¹

Researchers may take advantage of a recently published volume, containing source material concerned with martial law as reflected in the selected documents from the Office of the Council of Ministers.⁷² On the one hand, they shed light on the preparations for the visit as well as the related dilemmas and quandaries of the Polish side; on the other, they offer insights into the informal feedback that the Polish side received from the Soviet hosts.

The structure of the Office of the Council of Ministers included an undersecretary of state designated as the Government Press Officer.⁷³ In late 1981, Wiesław Górnicki was an experienced journalist working at the Bureau of the Government Press Officer⁷⁴,

⁷¹ See the memo drafted by the Department for Information of the CC PUWP: *Informacja o wizytach delegacji partyjno-państwowej PRL na czele z I sekretarzem KC PZPR, prezesem Rady Ministrów, tow. Wojciechem Jaruzelskim w Moskwie (1-2 III 1982 r.), Berlinie (29 III 1982 r.), Pradze (5 IV 1982 r.)* Warsaw 1982 and A. Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu...*, p. 293.

⁷² *Stan wojenny w Polsce z perspektywy Urzędu Rady Ministrów*. Edited, selected, and prepared for press by M. Jabłonowski, W. Janowski, G. Sołtysiak. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASPRA JR, 2017.

⁷³ More broadly in *Wstęp do Stan wojenny...*

⁷⁴ Born in 1931, died in 1996 in Warsaw, son of Kazimierz Górnicki and Maria Wolska. During World War II, he attended the clandestine Mikołaj Rej Secondary School in Warsaw, and after 1945 he continued at the Prince Józef Poniatowski Secondary School in Łowicz and at the State Secondary School of Mechanics and Aviation. Having graduated as aviator-technician, Górnicki studied for a year at the Faculty of Aviation, Hipolit Wawelberg & Stanisław Rotwand School of Engineering. He worked as a journalist at *Skrzydłata Polska* (1949–1953), *Żołnierz Wolności* (1953–1956), *Sztandar Młodych* (1955–1957), and *Świat* (1956–1961). War correspondent in the Middle East (1956) and Indonesia (1959–1960). From 1958 to 1961 commentator of the Polish Newsreel. Since 1961 in the US, where he studied journalism at Indiana University, also serving (until 1967) as the correspondent of the Polish Press Agency (PPA) at the UN. After returning to Poland, he worked at the PPA Head Office, and from 1968 to 1974 at the international department of the *Życie Warszawy* daily. From 1969 to 1980 host of the radio show *Peryskop*. In the 1970s, Górnicki also collaborated with such periodicals as *Współczesność*, *Dookoła świata*, *Kultura* and *Dialog*. From 1974 to 1981, member of the editorial team at the *Przekrój* weekly. In 1980, he became a member of the Presidium of the World Peace Council. In January 1981, he was invited to join the social advisory team to the Deputy Prime Minister M.F. Rakowski (which also included K. T. Toeplitz, J. Urban, J. Wiatr, J. Wójcik). On the staff of state administration since October 1981, he was considered one of the foremost propagandists of the then authorities. On the night when martial law was introduced, Górnicki was drafted into the army (serving as captain since 1981, promoted to major in 1982, and to lieutenant colonel in 1986). A close associate of General W. Jaruzelski (as an author of most of the latter's speeches, including the address of December 13, 1981). From December 1981 to February 1982, at the Government Press Office, from February to September 15, 1982, at the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers, subsequently head of the Studies Section to the President of the Council of Ministers (until January 1, 1984). From 1984 to 1985, director of the Independent Studies Section and Chair of the Defence Committee to the President of the Council of Ministers. From 1985 to August 1, 1989, director of the Independent Studies Section to the President of the Council of State. In 1986–1989, on the editorial council of the "Czytelnik" Publishing Cooperative. From August 1989 to December 31, 1990, director of the Political Department at the Chancellery of the President of the PPR, Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces. Górnicki retired in 1991.

and was highly devoted to W. Jaruzelski. One of his primary duties was to draft a speech for the general should martial law be declared. As Górnicki observed in his memoirs, it was a time when he abandoned journalism.⁷⁵ Although many of his reports were written to the order of the general and followed the latter's suggestions, there is a fair number of texts which Górnicki wrote of his own accord, responding to the need of the moment or recognising the need to inform his employer.⁷⁶ During those weeks, he gained unusually high political standing, speaking with Jaruzelski daily, participating in meetings and informal gatherings, and acting as a spokesperson during foreign visits. In February 1982, on the eve of his visit to Moscow, Górnicki was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office and proceeded to build an autonomous team; from January 1, 1984, onwards, he would head the Studies Section at the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers.⁷⁷

The current study focuses on two extremely interesting political reports Górnicki compiled for Prime Minister Gen. W. Jaruzelski concerning the Polish delegation's trip to Moscow. The first was written on February 16 during the preparatory stage, while the second dates to March 3 when the visit was in progress. They provide a rare insight into the political backstage of such interactions.

The report of February 16 conveys the author's reflections concerning the visit.⁷⁸ Qualified as "Secret, Special Significance," the author drafted the document intended to be read exclusively by the Prime Minister. Due to the sensitivity of the issues raised, the author did not sign the report and suggested that it be destroyed after use. W. Jaruzelski did not comply with the recommendation.

The formula of the document relies on loose reflections:

- it draws attention to the fact that, in the historical dimension, the visit will be more significant than Władysław Gomułka's⁷⁹ visit to Moscow in 1956. The

⁷⁵ W. Górnicki, *Teraz już można. Ze wspomnień kulawego Szerpy*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1999, pp. 8.

⁷⁶ Naturally, those were not the only reports reaching W. Jaruzelski, who would receive information from numerous sources and used several channels to obtain it, including informal ones. This group includes interesting memoranda drawn up by St. Ciosek, W. Pożoga and J. Urban, see A. Garlicki, *Memoriały zespołu trzech*, [in:] *Polski rok 1989. Sukcesy, zaniechania, porażki*. Edited by M. Jabłonowski, S. Stepka, S. Sulowski. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA, 2009. p. 37.

⁷⁷ The issue is discussed more broadly by G. Sołtysiak, *System doradców politycznych generała Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego. Historia Zespołu Studiów i Analiz* [in:] *Kuchnia władzy. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji 70-tej rocznicy urodzin Andrzeja Garlickiego*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza CZYTELNIK, 2005. pp. 310-326. See also *Raporty Wiesława Górnickiego dla gen. Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego. Rok 1986*. Edited by P. Dybicz and G. Sołtysiak. Warsaw: Fundacja Oratio Recta, 2012.

⁷⁸ *Stan wojenny w Polsce...*, p. 173. See also Doc. No. 7: 1982, 18 February, Warsaw. Report by Cpt. Wiesław Górnicki for the Prime Minister, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, in connection with the planned visit to Moscow.

⁷⁹ Gomułka Władysław (1905–1982), politician, workers' movement activist, since 1926 in the Communist Party of Poland, since 1942 in the PWP, in 1943 Secretary of the Central Committee (CC) PWP, in 1944–1949 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Regained Territories, in 1945–1948 Secretary General of the CC PWP. Accused of rightist–nationalist deviation, Gomułka was removed from office

choices available to the current Soviet leadership include either attempting to restore the classic Soviet socialist model in Poland with all its corollaries or coming to terms with the fact that individual socialist countries will invariably implement distinct solutions while adhering to USSR security requirements and general principles. The issue at stake was whether one adopts the imperial policy formula – in the executive sense – or the formula of a “socialist commonwealth of nations”, i.e., a kind of federation, not so much fully sovereign but internally and partially diplomatically autonomous socialist states. For Poland, “this is a fundamental issue for the coming decades”;

- the author emphasised that the Soviet leadership distrusted the Military Council of National Salvation and probably did not understand the unconventional formula adopted in Poland to resolve the political crisis. On the one hand, Gen. Jaruzelski enjoyed unquestionable confidence as commander-in-chief and prime minister, but on the other, the Soviet leadership did not accept the independent political role of the army. In their opinion, the military should exclusively serve as the armed hand of the Party. Górnicki surmised that a considerable proportion of questions asked by the Soviet side would concern the relationship between the party and the army. The explanations would necessarily underscore the specificity of the Polish circumstances and reiterate “what was there to be done when the Party was practically on the verge of total paralysis.” In this case, “we come to receive congratulations rather than apologise, because by relying on our own ideas and our own efforts, we saved the USSR from having to intervene while safeguarding the party.”
- it was underlined that an important option regarding Poland was unavailable to the Soviet leadership. They did not have a rival ruling suit at their disposal, a replacement for the current government. This is an extremely important asset, the author notes. Gen. Jaruzelski’s position was virtually unassailable. Moreover, the general was the “last hope” for Moscow as well. Any overly intense pressure, let alone conspiracy, would have immediately swayed even those reluctant factions of the public to side with the general. Additionally, the army was thoroughly loyal to the latter. The author compared Jaruzelski’s position to that of Gomulka at the time of his visit to Moscow in 1956.
- in the previous years, the USSR had been experiencing an evident low in many areas. Its strategic position had been seriously threatened. Most countries bordering on the USSR had recently changed their approach towards their neighbour, to its disadvantage. A clear and dangerous technological gap in military microelectronics had developed on the Soviet side. Economic performance is practically at zero level, while the situation in agriculture was downright

and suffered repressions in 1951–1954. The year 1956 saw him elected with tremendous support as First Secretary of the CC PUWP, the office he held until 1970.

catastrophic. Consequently, the Soviet power elite displayed a renewed encirclement complex and, simultaneously, annoyance with the fact that the state lagged behind the rest of the world. There were no more spectacular achievements, such as the first Sputnik, and no clear prospects for improvement. There was a tendency among some of the Soviet leadership to undertake more aggressive initiatives. Therefore, during the visit, especially when addressing a broader forum, it would be advisable to speak not only to Comrade Brezhnev but also to his potential successors, distinctly highlighting the matter of USSR security and Poland's role in it, as well as the importance of the alliance system for the USSR: "not only do they help us, but we help them too – even when we are temporarily in trouble."

- it was stressed that for decades, "almost from the earliest days of the revolution", a so-called "miraculous option" – Germany – was constantly featured in the thought of Moscow leadership. Górnicki thought that there was sufficient evidence, from the Brest Treaty of 1919 to Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in 1981, that periodically – regardless of who currently held power – the idea of an agreement with Germany to undermine other imperialisms persistently recurred in Soviet political thought originating from the Kremlin. On numerous occasions, Soviet-German alignment came at Poland's expense, or at least at the price of Poland's reduced standing. Even then, the possibility of neutralising a united Germany was certainly being considered theoretically. It is doubtful whether such an operation was feasible without at least a symbolic correction of the German-Polish border. Therefore, the Polish argument that "Yalta and Potsdam are inseparable" must be underscored as much as possible during the current visit; you cannot have Yalta (the division of Europe into spheres of influence) without Potsdam (the western border of Poland).
- the author pointed out that if, in the course of conversations in a narrow circle, reproaches were made suggesting that Poles were such a wayward nation, that the PUP let the revolution run wild, that nationalism prevailed, etc., such a debate should be cut short with a reminder that Soviet history saw not only the storming of the Winter Palace but also Kronstadt and protracted peasant revolts. Moreover, if remarks to that effect were even harsher, it should be noted that "there were 3 million collaborators in the occupied Soviet territories, not to mention General Andrei Vlasov's army." This theme would serve as a backup topic in case of an unfavourable atmosphere in the room.
- according to the report's author, the lack of Polish Sovietology took a painful toll on the interactions with the Soviet side. In his opinion, the Soviet department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had never advanced a single original idea. Moreover, there were too many direct connections there. A sensible, intelligent group dedicated to investigations into Soviet policies was nowhere to be found at the Polish academic institutions. The situation with the Polish

embassy in Moscow is even worse. Given all that, it was necessary to feel one's way in the dark during the Moscow visit. One should rather rely on the general's personal acquaintances and one's own political instincts than on studies.

Recapitulating his argument, Górnicki stressed that a "Polish hetman" should travel to Moscow in early March 1982 "with friendship, but without embarrassment, with an honest alliance beneficial to both sides, with gratitude for assistance, but without humility."

Maj. Wiesław Górnicki drew up another report for General Wojciech Jaruzelski immediately after the delegation's stay in Moscow.⁸⁰ In the document, he disclosed that during a lunch at the Kremlin, the general director of TASS, Sergei Losiev, offered to meet him for a "friendly conversation." The two had met when Górnicki worked as a correspondent of the Polish Press Agency in New York, where Losiev headed the TASS branch. In 1982, he was one of the key figures in Soviet political and media life and attended the aforementioned Kremlin lunch as a high-ranking adviser. In Górnicki's opinion, the invitation was inherently political, and no doubt authorised at a high level. The conversation took place on 2 March at the TASS office and lasted an hour and a half. According to the author of the report, the intention behind it was to unofficially convey to the Polish side the suggestions and concerns that it would have been awkward for the Soviet leadership to formulate in the course of official talks with Gen. Jaruzelski. Losiev confronted his interlocutor with a range of questions and doubts spanning several thematic groups:

- revisionists, including the case of Hieronim Kubiak⁸¹—why does the General tolerate this "head revisionist"? Losiev's hostility towards Kubiak was, as Górnicki saw it, evident and intransigent. There could be no doubt, in his opinion, that the Soviet side had received the full dossier on Kubiak compiled in Warsaw "and hardly by the embassy." Subsequently, Losiev would also refer to the matter of the "counter-revolutionary" Henryk Samsonowicz⁸², the rector of the University of Warsaw.
- according to the author of the report, the question of liberals in the party leadership was a recurring theme in the conversation. In this context, Losiev mentioned the names of M. Rakowski and Kazimierz Barcikowski, whom he brutally attacked, stressing: "how can the Party get back on its feet when a

⁸⁰ *Stan wojenny w Polsce...* p. 181. See also Doc. No. 8: 1982, March 3, Warsaw. Report by Maj. Wiesław Górnicki for the Prime Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski from the conversation with Director General of TASS, Segei Losiev, conducted on March 2, 1982.

⁸¹ Kubiak Hieronim (born in 1934), sociologist, politician, PUWP activist, in 1981–1986 a member of the PB CC PUWP, in 1981–1982 Secretary of the CC PUWP, and in 1989 participant of the Round Table Talks.

⁸² Samsonowicz Henryk (born in 1930), historian, medievalist, professor of humanities, in 1980–1982 Rector of the University of Warsaw, in 1989 a participant of the Round Table Talks, and in 1989–1991 Minister of National Education.

drunkard and a capitulant, who had allowed Solidarity to grow impudent, is in charge of personnel affairs?” Moreover, he was interested in whether the liberals in the party leadership had too much influence over the General.

- the TASS journalist did not understand the hostile climate created in Warsaw around those he considered idealistic communists, such as Stanisław Kociołek.⁸³
- in the course of the conversation, Losiev raised the issue of the PUWP’s allied parties: the United People’s Party and the Democratic Party. Having misgivings in this regard, Losiev stressed “tough luck, sometimes you have to support the parties of kulaks and NEPmen.” Górnicki noted that his interlocutor was already thinking in the categories formulated by Konstantin Chernenko, “whom everyone in Moscow regards as the undisputed successor to Brezhnev.”
- the issue of the role and status of the MCNS. According to Górnicki, the TASS director ostentatiously ignored the role of the Polish Armed Forces in overcoming the crisis in Poland. The author of the report observed that the Soviet programme of the visit omitted all the military ranks of the Polish delegates, including Gen. Jaruzelski. He emphasised “with an almost offensive ostentation [Losiev] took no interest in the role of the army.” Górnicki concluded that the Soviets were anxious not to set a precedent in the case.

The author further reported that he had attempted to mitigate his interlocutor’s misgivings but without much success.

The reports warrant the conclusion that Wiesław Górnicki was conversant with international politics and that he formulated his assessments clearly and uncompromisingly, informing Jaruzelski about matters that many would not dare to say or write about directly. He did not regard the post he held merely as a job or a political choice and made no secret of his fascination with the then Prime Minister and First Secretary.⁸⁴ The aforementioned documents reveal the secrets of the diplomatic safes in Warsaw and Moscow in the first weeks of 1982, showing the material which reached Jaruzelski’s desk not only through the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Foreign Department of the CC PUWP.⁸⁵ They indicate that prior to the departure, the Polish delegation had no definite information concerning the potential new formula of the Soviet foreign policy in Central and Eastern Europe. They feared that the German

⁸³ Kociołek Stanisław (1933–2015), sociologist, teacher, PUWP activist, in 1964–1967 First Secretary of the Warsaw Committee PUWP, in the years 1967–1980 First Secretary of the RC PUWP in Gdańsk, in 1968–1971 Member of the PB CC PUWP, in 1970 Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, in 1970–1971 Secretary of the CC PUWP, 1971–1978 Ambassador of the PPR to Belgium, 1980 Ambassador of the PPR to Tunisia, 1980–1982 First Secretary of the Warsaw Committee PUWP, and in the years 1982–1985 Ambassador of the PPR to Moscow.

⁸⁴ More broadly in SOŁTYSIĄK, Grzegorz. *System doradców politycznych...*, pp. 310–311.

⁸⁵ Incidentally, it may be noted that Górnicki’s activity was viewed with disfavour in the CC PUWP, whose members found it not only disparaged the role of the “party” advisors, but also undermined the importance of the Central Committee apparatus; see M. Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne 1981–1983*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ISKRY, 2004, pp. 447–448.

card would come into play once again, sensed a far-reaching distrust with respect to the Military Council for National Salvation, and were aware that Polish diplomacy was poorly supported due to a lack of developed Soviet studies. Moscow's concerns included the increasing influence of "liberals and revisionists" in the leadership of the PUWP, as well as the seemingly growing role of the UPP and the DP in the party framework; it was unequivocally articulated that the crisis in Poland should be overcome by the structures of the PUWP as opposed to the power ministries. A historian of diplomacy concludes that the propaganda goal of the visit by the Polish delegation was accomplished, as evinced, in his opinion, by the extensive coverage in the Soviet newspapers. At the time in Poland, any pertinent articles would appear only in *Trybuna Ludu* and *Żołnierz Wolności*. Also, there were minor discrepancies between the Polish and Soviet texts of the communiqué, which was undoubtedly drafted by W. Górnicki. The Polish text referred to a "territorial and political order in Europe," whereas its Soviet counterpart spoke merely of an "order in Europe."⁸⁶ The formal political outcome of the visit was that in May 1982, the PUWP Politburo adopted *Programmatic premises for strengthening and developing relations with the USSR*. The document envisaged efforts to draw more extensively on the traditions of the workers' movement in Poland, the activation of the PUWP and the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions, as well as the restoration of external cultural and academic contacts. Andrzej Skrzypek noted that even if those measures had been successful, they would not have helped Jaruzelski's government in the diplomatic arena since the East-West relations did not look good either.⁸⁷

Conclusions

Martial law in Poland, introduced on December 13, 1981 by the Council of State at the request of Wojciech Jaruzelski, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Prime Minister, had a profound significance for the relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) due to several key aspects:

- firstly, it prevented the intervention of the USSR (the main reason for introducing martial law was an attempt to suppress growing social tensions and opposition activities, especially the Solidarity movement, which was gaining popularity and influence. There were fears that if the situation in Poland got out of control, it might persuade the USSR to intervene militarily, as was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1968 during the Prague Spring);
- secondly, it strengthened Poland's "autonomy" (in a sense, the decision to introduce martial law was an attempt by the Polish authorities to demonstrate that

⁸⁶ A. Skrzypek, *Dyplomatyczne dzieje...*, p. 342.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*. p. 343.

- they were able to independently solve the country's internal problems without direct intervention from the USSR. Even though the Soviet Union put pressure on Poland, to deal with "counter-revolutionary" elements, Jaruzelski and other leaders of the Polish People's Republic aimed to avoid direct Soviet intervention);
- thirdly, it reduced the state of tension between the two countries (the introduction of martial law and the subsequent suppression of the Solidarity movement briefly reduced tensions between Poland and the USSR, because the Soviet Union considered these actions as a step towards restoring order and protecting the socialist bloc. However, in the long run these events contributed to the growth of social dissatisfaction and the weakening of the communists' position in Poland).

In the months and years that followed, Jaruzelski's government – with Wiesław Górnicki still in the General's closest circle – attempted to pursue the concept of the so-called front of national unity, developing the structures of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, an organisation through which the public would manifest their support for the policies of the Party and the government.⁸⁸ In 1983, the martial law authorities established new, so-called industry trade unions and, subsequently, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions in November 1984. In 1982, Jaruzelski announced far-reaching political and economic transformations and reforms. The economic situation was extremely complicated, and between 1982 and 1984, economic development was stimulated essentially by extensions of working time and changes in the structure of imports.⁸⁹ Attempts were made to implement a model which represented a blend of real socialism and capitalism. In the latter half of the 1980s, such a path was pursued, in particular by the governments headed by Zbigniew Messner and Mieczysław F. Rakowski. The former submitted a package of legislation which made up the Stage Two of the economic reform, but it did not win popular support in the referendum of June 1988. Similarly, the fairly radical steps taken by Rakowski's government, especially regarding the profitability and independence of individual economic entities in the state, did not gain acceptance. The failure of the reforms should also be attributed to the inefficiency of the nomenklatura system and the incompetent economic apparatus.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ The organisation (initially known as Citizens' Committees for National Salvation) was created with a propaganda goal in mind, specifically to demonstrate that Poles supported the policies of the party and the government. The declaration on the establishment of the PMNR was signed by the PUWP, UPP, DP, "PAX" Association, Christian Social Association, and the Polish Catholic-Social Union, while Jan Dobraczyński was appointed its chairman. In July 1983, the constitutional provision on the PMNR was replaced with a provision on the Front of National Unity. The PMNR would make decisions with regard to electoral lists for the national councils and the Sejm. After martial law was lifted, the previously suspended social organisations—now reactivated—were informally required to declare their accession to the PMNR. The organisation discontinued its activities on November 8, 1989.

⁸⁹ M. Jabłonowski, *Agonia systemu. Ostatni etap gospodarki nakazowo-rozdzielczej*, [in:] *Polski rok 1989. Sukcesy, zaniechania, porażki*, vol. 1. Edited and prefaced by M. Jabłonowski, S. Stęпка, S. Sulowski. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA, 2009, p. 183.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

Furthermore, the authorities of the period introduced major changes in the political framework of the state, establishing the State Tribunal and the Constitutional Tribunal in 1985, the Consultative Council to the President of the State Council in 1986, and the office of the Ombudsman in 1987. Despite those efforts, another wave of strikes went through the country in 1988 (in April and August). As the years went by, Poles seemed to grow more and more tired of the difficulties of daily life than intimidated by the policy of the authorities.⁹¹ The measures implemented by the latter in the second half of the 1980s were ineffective, as the successive governments were unwilling or unable to engage in a genuine dialogue with the public in general and specifically with the opposition, which had resumed legal activity.

Martial law was suspended in December 1982, and on July 22, 1983, the Council of State announced its lifting. Several years later, in September 1986, Lech Wałęsa established the legally functioning Temporary Council of Solidarity. Martial law also had long-term consequences for Polish-Soviet relations, contributing to changes in the Eastern Bloc. Although in the short term it may have seemed that these relations were strengthened by the common goal of maintaining the communist order, in the long term this contributed to the weakening of the USSR's influence in Poland. The processes that began in the 1980s ultimately led to the fall of communism in Poland in 1989 and a change in the balance of power in the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe. Martial law was therefore a key moment in Poland's history, having far-reaching consequences not only for the country's internal situation, but also for its relations with the USSR and its position in the Eastern Bloc.

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⁹¹ A. Dudek, Z. Zblewski, *Utopia...*, p. 309.

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SSRS pozicija dėl karo padėties įvedimo Lenkijoje atsižvelgiant į generolo Wojciecho Jaruzelskio vizitą Maskvoje 1982 m. kovo 1–2 d.

Dr. Marek Jabłonowski

Varmijos Mozūrų universitetas Olštynė, Lenkija
El p. marek.jablonowski@uwm.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-6333-7386

Dr. Wojciech Jakubowski

Varšuvos universitetas, Lenkija
El p. wj.jakubowski@uw.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-1552-8858

Santrauka

Šiame straipsnyje aptariamas ypatingas Lenkijos ir Sovietų Sąjungos santykių istorijos momentas, kai Lenkijos Liaudies Respublikos valdžia devintojo dešimtmečio pradžioje po audringų pirmojo „Solidarumo“ mėnesių nusprendė įvesti karo padėtį. Stiprus ministerijų kišimasis į šalies vidaus gyvenimą ir dėl to kilusi Lenkijos jungtinės darbininkų partijos, kuriai vadovavo generolas Wojciechas Jaruzelskis, marginalizacija buvo kritikuojama Maskvoje.

Šioje studijoje pristatomi atrinkti išslaptinti PPR Ministrų Tarybos biuro dokumentai, atskleidžiantys Lenkijos pusės abejones ir baimes prieš planuojamą oficialios partijos ir vyriausybės delegacijos vizitą į SSRS 1982 m. kovo mėn., įžvalgos apie kai kurias pastabas, kurias sovietų pusė per vizitą perdavė partneriams lenkams.

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